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Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods:
A Trade Perspective
Chris Brummer*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years, regional organizations have emerged as the fora of
choice for tackling many of the world's most intransigent political and economic
challenges. By providing smaller and more accessible venues for negotiations,
regional organizations often make possible a more efficient means of consensus
building than that usually available under multilateral frameworks like the World
Trade Organization. And because many governments are more familiar with
their neighbors than with far-flung multilateral interlocutors, regional
organizations-frequently referred to in the literature as regional integration
agreements ("RIAs")'-are also well-suited to achieving results in non-economic
issue areas such as the environment, peace-building, and immigration.
Yet despite their popularity, regional organizations are decidedly
controversial, particularly among economists, for the very fact that they depart
from multilateral (global) free trade and thereby the field's normative preference
for efficiency.' As integrative agreements ony between neighboring countries,
RIAs do not always create new trading opportunities. Instead, by lowering tariffs
on goods flowing between member states, while at the same time retaining high
tariffs against goods from third-party countries, they substitute intra-bloc
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Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. Many thanks to Margaret Blair,
Paul Edelman, Larry Heifer, and Jide Nzelibe for their comments and suggestions. Errors are
entirely my own.
Due to the underlying commitments on which regional organizations are based, regional
organizations are often referred to by economists and many legal scholars as regional integration
arrangements, a terminology reflecting both the political and economic underpinnings of the
organizations. This Article will use both terms interchangeably.
See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, a leading critic of regionalism, in his influential article,
Regionalism versus Mulfilateralism, 15 World Econ 535, 550-54 (1992) (expressing skepticism about
whether regionalism serves the "widely-shared objective of multilateral free trade for all").
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imports for what would otherwise be imports from outside the group.3 Because
of such trade diversion, many academics and policymakers have relied on
longstanding economic theory to characterize regional free trade as a "club
good"-that is, as a special private benefit deriving value, in part, from the fact
that nonparticipants are excluded.4
This characterization not only highlights the fact that regional trade
agreements are distinguishable from other kinds of accords in which
cooperation creates benefits for both signatories and nonsignatories. It also
implies two core descriptive claims regarding the underlying dynamics of
regional integration. First, it suggests that regional organizations have strong
internal dynamics that create overwhelming incentives for countries to form or
to join them and for outsiders, in response, to create their own organizations in
order to enjoy similar benefits. Second, it implies that the size of any regional
organization will be, in part, a function of the number of other countries that
consume the club good. Where too many countries create a preferential market,
a certain "congestion point" will be reached; beyond that juncture, adding
additional members will diminish the value of membership in the organization
for all participants.
This Article undertakes the first systematic examination of RIAs as clubs in
the legal literature and argues that although regional organizations exhibit some
club-like dynamics they are at best incomplete forms of such cooperation. Two
shortcomings are specifically identified. First, the Article shows that the legal
architecture of trade agreements limits the degree to which regional
organizations are truly exclusive. As a result, regional organizations provide
fewer benefits to members than classic economic clubs. Second, regional
organizations are heterogeneous in ways other than those envisioned in the
classic economic club literature. Specifically, members differ not in terms of the

3

For a comprehensive discussion of this phenomenon in the legal literature see Sungjoon Cho,
Breaking the Barier between Regionalism and Multilateralism:A New Perpective on Trade Regionalism, 42
Harv Intl L J 419 (2001) (outlining political and economic perspectives of trade regionalism). See
also Chris Brummer, Ties that Bind?: Regionalism, Commercial Treaties and the Future of Economic
Integration, 60 Vand L Rev 1349, 1354-62 (2007).
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See, for example, Todd Sandier, Regional Public Goods: Demand and Institutions, 1 Rev Intl Org 5
(2006). See also Michele Fratianni and John Pattison, InternationalOganisationsin a World of Regional
Trade Agreements: Lessonsfrom Club Theory, 24 World Econ 333, 333-358 (2001) (asserting that club
theory reveals that regional trade agreements are not flukes, but have proliferated because
cooperation is feasible and attractive in smaller groups with a few larger players); Michael
Wohlgemuth and Clara Brandi, Strategies of Flexible Integration and Enlargementof the European Union:
A Club-Theoretical and ConstitutionalEconomics Perspective, 06/7 Freiburger Discussion Papers on
Constitutional Economics (2006), available online at <http://walter-eucken-institut.de/
publikationen/06_7bw.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (analyzing the EU as a club and the "club-ofclubs" approach as an ideal-type model for a European Union of the future).
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degree to which they prefer the club good-as is the theoretical conception of
heterogeneity in the club goods literature-but instead in terms of their
qualitative characteristics and competitiveness. Each member will thus not only
incur different costs in joining a regional organization, but will also have a
different point at which the preferential trading market will be congested with
too many competitors. This heterogeneity further suggests that, all other political
factors being equal,' expansion of an RIA's membership will be based not so
much on the economic competitiveness of new members, but instead on the
inefficiency of a prospective member state's domestic industries relative to those
of each of the RIA's members.
Before proceeding, however, a brief note as to this Article's methodology is
in order. I consciously employ a series of hypothetical scenarios to demonstrate
the welfare implications of certain RIA structural characteristics. Though
virtually all of the examples are drawn from actual events identified in the
Article's footnotes, I use abstract labels (such as "Country A" as opposed to
"Germany") to underscore the generalizability and broad applicability of the
incentives many, if not most, members of RIAs face. By emphasizing the
commonality of structural dynamics driving economic integration, I hope to
spur a broader theoretical re-examination of regional trading blocs untethered
from geographic or institutional qualifications.
II. A PRIMER ON THE THEORY OF CLUB GOODS
To understand just how the theory of clubs relates to regional
organizations, some introductory remarks regarding the economic theory of
clubs are required. As an academic undertaking, the study of clubs provides a
theoretical foundation for the study of cooperation. In particular, it is used to
assess why groups arise and to what extent members in groups should exclude
nonmembers from cooperation or joining the group in order to maximize utility.
Economists generally define clubs as voluntary groups in which two or
more individuals cooperate in order to create a common shared good.6 These
common goods share two characteristics. First, they are at least partly

s
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Indeed, it is critical to emphasize that many countries join regional organizations for not only
economic reasons but for political purposes as well. See Sungjoon Cho, Defragmening World Trade,
27 Nw J Intl L & Bus 39, 43 (2006) (noting that RIAs "are often suffused with political
considerations that may prevail over.., concerns of economic policy").
Richard Comes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externaliies, Public Goods, and Club Goods 347
(Cambridge 2d ed 1996) (differentiating "club" goods and "public" goods).
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"rivalrous. '

7

In other words, when one unit of the good is consumed by one

individual, it detracts from the consumption opportunities of others.8 Second,
club goods are "excludable," that is, the common good and its benefits can be
kept within the group and away from others.9 Together, rivalrousness and
excludability denote utility derived from the creation of an exhaustible good that
is at the same time protected from consumption by outsiders to the group who
did not contribute to its creation.
The optimal size of a club is largely a function of what economists call
congestion, or the size at which the costs of adding additional members
outweighs the benefits.1 ° Club theory holds that where membership is small,
members can consume a good without any one member's consumption
detracting greatly from the ability of others to consume the good. However,
once the membership in a club becomes so large that, due to the rivalrous nature
of the benefit, members are less able to enjoy the benefit due to the presence of
others, club theory implies that membership should be closed and no new
members added.
The classic example used to describe the dynamics of a club is the
construction and maintenance of a swimming pool.11 On her own, one person
typically will not have the resources to build a swimming pool, and even if she
did, she might not have enough incentive to build it by herself. There are,
however, economies of scale that arise with the provision of a pool. In
particular, two people, acting in a club, are much better suited to buy and to
operate a pool than one, and four are even better than two, and so on. So long
as the number of pool club members remains modest, the enjoyment by one will
not greatly undermine the enjoyment of the other group members, and thus it is
attractive to have multiple members of the club.
Nevertheless, the economies of scale made possible by cooperation are not
infinite. As membership in the club increases, the marginal costs to existing
members will increase as crowding of the pool takes place. Furthermore, as
membership grows, the marginal benefit of any additional member will be ever
smaller as users may have to account for longer waits, less room to swim, and
7

See id at 8 (defining rivalrous goods as arising "when a unit of the good can be consumed by one
individual without detracting, in the slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available
to others from that unit').

8

Id.

9

See id at 349 (describing excludability as arising where nonmembers can be monitored or barred).

10

Id at 348 (defining congestion).

11

This example was first introduced by James M. Buchanan in his seminal piece An Economic Theory
of Clubs, 32 Economica 1 (1965) (asserting that "there exists some most preferred or optimal
membership for almost any activity and this membership varies in some relation to economic
factors").
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higher bacteria counts in the swimming pool.12 Thus eventually, the addition of
new members in the swimming club will overwhelm the utility for existing
members. At this point, the optimal size of the consumption group will be
smaller than the size of the population.
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Figure 1: OptimalProvision of a Swimming Pool

Economic clubs, economists explain, work in the same way. By allowing
members to draw from one another's characteristics, clubs create private
benefits for members. Because, however, the utility of each individual's
consumption of the benefit is a function of the number of others who consume
the good, congestion can arise. As a result, there are natural limits to the size of
membership in a club, limits that are themselves tied to the kinds of obligations
members undertake, the degree of preferences among members, and the kind of
good to be provided. 3 These factors inform the point at which congestion is
reached.' 4

12

See Comes and Sandier, The Theory of Externaliiesat 348 (cited in note 6) (describing the "sundry"
forms that congestion may take).

13

Todd Sandier and John Tschirhart, Club Theoy: Thirty Years Later, 93 Pub Choice 335, 338 (1997)
(providing a survey of club theory with an emphasis on the last fifteen years).

14

Id.
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III. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PRODUCTION OF
CLUB GOODS

Regional organizations are analogous to clubs in a variety of ways. In
regional organizations, geographically proximate countries pledge to adopt
common legal rules or principles regarding, at a minimum, the preferential
treatment of goods from other members of the organization. 5 Usually, such
commitments include most-favored nation ("MFN") treatment, whereby a state
accords to a counterparty the same favorable terms it offers in agreements with
other nations,16 and national treatment, in which countries afford one another's
nationals the same benefits and treatment they afford their own. 7 Some RIAs,
like the European Union, are also empowered to address policies concerning
investment and services.'" Meanwhile, others, like the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the Central American Free Trade Agreement
("CAFTA"), grant investors from signatory countries the right to sue member
governments whenever a state fails to live up to its treaty commitments
concerning foreign direct investment. 9 Thus, if a member state decides to
discriminate against a foreign investor, that investor, as a citizen of a member
state, would be able to compel arbitration with the host state government in
order to obtain compensation.
The logic of regional integration is derived largely from the perceived
advantages of collective action. Cooperation in the form of regional integration
makes possible the creation of a larger market, as well as access to that market
on terms better than those available to outsiders to the regional group. Suppose,
for example, Country X and Country Y are members of the same regional
organization, and the rules under which a regional organization operates require

that participants impose no more than a $1 duty on goods. Otherwise, each
imposes a $2 duty on goods imported from nonmembers. Suppose further that
Country Z is not a signatory to the regional treaty. In such circumstances,

15

For a comprehensive account of RIAs, see Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, Regional Integrafion

16

and Development (Oxford 2003).
World Trade Organization, Princibles of the Trading System,

17

(2005), available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/fact2_e.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
Id.

18

See Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997 OJ (C 340) 3, art 57 (Nov 10, 1997)
(indicating that the EU's Council of Ministers may, with certain restrictions, adopt measures on
the movement of direct investment). Investment policies are also addressed indirectly through
other programs such as the WTO's General Agreement on Trade and Services. See also
Brummer, 60 Vand L Rev at 1372-73 (cited in note 3).

19

See North American Free Trade Agreement (1993), ch 10, 32 ILM 289 and Central American
Free Trade Agreement (2004), ch 11, 43 ILM 514.
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Country Y will enjoy a competitive advantage over Country Z when exporting
its goods to fellow members of the regional organization, including Country X.
All things being equal, trade will be diverted to Country Y from Country Z.
Cooperation among countries also allows members to leverage their
collective voice in international negotiations. 20 Suppose that Countries X, Y, and
Z are members of an RIA and are looking to negotiate trade terms with Country
A, which is twice as large as each of the members alone. Individually, each
country would have less leverage in negotiating the terms of a treaty. However,
by pooling sovereignties and resources, they will be much better positioned to
speak with one voice and to advance their collective strategic interests.
Importantly, such coordination allows regional organizations to improve their
members' leverage not only in economic affairs, but in the political and military
fields as well.
These advantages have led to the description of regional organizations as
institutions that create club goods. 2' Though RIAs may erode global welfare
insofar as domestic consumers may have to pay more for goods than if no such
RIA existed, they also create what can be considered to be important excludable
benefits for domestic firms of member countries. By creating a common market
to which members enjoy special preferential access, regional organizations
functionally exclude outsiders from the group's collective resources. That is, by
excluding outsiders, members are able to draw on each other's markets to the
advantage of their home state exporters. In addition, by coordinating political
power, members may more effectively extract rents from outsiders in the form
of economic, political, and, possibly, even military concessions.2 3
The literature further suggests that RIAs experience congestion as new
members join.24 Some economists have, for example, modeled regional
20

21

This fact is often raised by countries in the European Union, such as Germany and France, as
justification for their membership. Of particular emphasis in such explanations have been the
benefits of European cooperation when negotiating trade agreements with powerful countries
outside the region, such as the United States and China.
Among the most prominent voices forwarding this argument has been Todd Sandier. See
generally Sandier, 1 Rev Intl Org (cited in note 4).

22
23

Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration at 65 (cited in note 15) (noting that RIAs not only affect
imports, but also promise the benefits of duty-free access for exports to partner markets).
Id at 6 (describing governments' desire to maintain influence and sovereignty by "pooling
[sovereignty] with others in areas of economic management where most nation-states are too
small to act alone").

24

Soamiely Andriamananajara, On the Size and Number of Regional Integration Agreements: A Political
Economy Model, Policy Research Working Paper 2117 (World Bank 1999), available online at
<http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1999/09/
(visited Nov 17, 2007)
14/000094946_99060411032930/Rendered/PDF/multpage.pdf>
(finding that where trading blocs do not have open membership, their creation will inevitably lead
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integration as an event in which RIA members compare the gains from getting
preferential access to the new member's market with the losses for having to
share its original preferential market with the new member."i Meanwhile,
political choice theory suggests that although liberalization may create certain
benefits for governments in terms of economic prosperity, after a certain point,
integration will generate fewer political gains for governments.2 6 This is because
even though countries as a whole may benefit from liberalization, not all
individuals and industries will prosper since some foreign firms will be more
competitive than domestic industries.27 Moreover, those firms that suffer a loss
of market share due to globalization will penalize governments that open or plan
to open their markets to more efficient competitors. These costs will likely
outweigh political gains because those benefitting in the aggregate most from
liberalization-namely individual domestic consumers-will often not be as
effective as producers at promoting their interests.2i Furthermore, the domestic
political process often assigns disproportionate weight to the interests of
domestic producers as compared to those of individual domestic consumers,
though of course consuming industries may still wield significant political
influence.29

25

to the creation of competing blocs). See also Monika Tothova and James F. Oehmke, Harmonizjng
Standards as Institutions, 1, 7, 20, Paper presented at the 7th International Conference on
"Institutions in Transitions," Kranjska Gora, Slovenia (June 19-20, 2003), available online at
(visited Nov 17,
<http://www.umar.gov.si/conference/2003/papers/Tothova-Oehmke.pdf>
2007) (finding that where club goods are characterized by congestion and excludable benefits,
standards are likely to develop at each level of organization, for example, global, less-than-global,
and national).
See Andriamananajara, On the SiZe and Number of Regional IntegrationAgreements at 2 (cited in note

26

24).
Schiff and Winters, Regional Integration at 89 (cited in note 15) ("Trade creation can be a mixed

27

blessing for a negotiating government: it generates surpluses for consumers at home and for
exporters in the partner country but reduces them for one of the [government's] main [domestic]
lobbying groups-domestic import-competing producers.").
Id.

28

29

Warren F. Schwartz and Alan 0. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most FavoredNation Obligation
and Its Exceptionsin the WTO/GATT System, 16 Ind Rev Law & Econ 27, 28 (1996).
Id.
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Figure2: OptimalProvision of Regional Trade

The existence of tradeoffs accompanying RIA membership implies that the
gains of adding an additional member will be large where the bloc is small and
that these gains will likely offset the costs of opening home markets. As the bloc
expands, however, the marginal benefit of an additional new market will
decrease. An increase from two to three members will provide, in other words, a
greater benefit to members than an increase in membership from ten to eleven
members. On the other hand, as the size of a regional organization increases, the
existing market will be shared by more and more competitors. Club theory
consequently predicts that members' incentives for expanding will decrease,
particularly in light of domestic producers' concerns. Ultimately, regional
organizations will reach a tipping point where crowding occurs, and current
members will reject new members. Meanwhile, remaining outsiders likely will
seek to form a bloc of their own.30

30

Richard Baldwin, A Domino Theogy of Regionalism, Nat Bur Econ Res Working Paper 4465 (1993),
available online at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w4465.v5.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007)
(hypothesizing that the enlargement of regional organizations shifts the political equilibrium of
nonmember countries and causes some of them to seek membership in the group or other
groups).
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IV. REGIONAL TRADE AS AN INCOMPLETE CLUB GOOD

For all of the usefulness that club theory provides in illustrating the
incentives driving regional integration, it overlooks two qualitative aspects of
regional organization that make the club goods analogy problematic. First, the
above model envisions largely homogeneous or similarly situated countries when
assessing the growth of the formation of regional organizations. Second, it
assumes that regional organizations exercise fully effective exclusion
mechanisms. These assumptions, however, are often inaccurate, suggesting RIAs
are at best incomplete club goods.
A. THE PROBLEM OF HETEROGENEOUS CONGESTION

Many quantitative economic assessments of regional organizations as clubs
are at least implicitly premised on homogenous country membership. In other
words, regional member states are largely assumed to be similar to one another
in size and market power. Club theory, as a general matter, has considerable
difficulty modeling member heterogeneity beyond accounting for depth of
participant preference. To return to the swimming pool analogy, club theory can
only account for how many times a member wants to use the pool, and not, say,
for the different sizes of individuals using the club. Thus, even though a child
may take up less space than a six foot man, and will thus interfere less with the
enjoyment of others, club theory rarely deals with such qualitative differences.
Instead, by focusing on the depth of preferences, it seeks to determine what
kind of fees or tolls to administer to swimmers such that they contribute to the
extent that they use the pool.
Nevertheless, regional organizations do not always consist of
homogeneous (or similarly situated) member states. Instead, many, if not most,
regional organizations, like NAFTA and the Southern African Customs Union,
are either organized around one large country, or, as in the case of the EU and
MERCOSUR, a group of powerful countries. In such arrangements, countries
with large economies are often the "hub" of economic activity in the region
around which smaller markets, or "spokes," interact.3'
This heterogeneity is important because it suggests multiple equilibria for
congestion for RIA member states. Because countries and their respective
markets are unique, members will not all experience the same costs (or benefits)
31

This phenomenon also characterizes a rise in bilateral treaty making. See Tiziana Bonapace,
Regionalism, Multilateralism and Development: An Ongoing Debate, 8-9, available online at
<http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/tradev04_s2.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (noting how
larger countries despite being members of RIAs conclude bilateral agreements as part of an
"offensive trade strategy" to find smaller "spoke" countries for their exports).
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when regional organizations grow. Consider, for example, a situation where
Countries X, Y, and Z are already members of a regional organization. Assume
further that Country A wishes to join the organization, and its economy and
industries are more competitive than those of Countries Y and Z, though less
competitive than that of Country X. Where each country assesses accession
based on the consequences for domestic industries and special interests,
Countries Y and Z will be more likely than Country X to reject Country A's
accession. Even though Country A may provide new markets, market
penetration will likely be difficult because of the inferior nature of the domestic
industries in Countries Y and Z. Furthermore, Countries Y and Z will have to
share their preferential market with Country A, which would likely result in a
decline in their share of economic activities. On the other hand, in contrast to
Countries Y and Z, Country X would find Country A's accession attractive. Not
only would it gain an additional market for its exports, but it would also be able
to continue to dominate the preferential market it has enjoyed, assuming
accession does not in some way bolster Country A's competitiveness.
Thus, as this example illustrates, members will have their own preferences
as to the extent and size of regional integration where congestion arises at
different points for each country. Moreover, congestion will depend on-and
indeed be defined by-something other than the mere number of members in a
regional organization, as classical club theory postulates. Instead, congestion will
reflect the qualitative make up of the group and comprise a function of the
comparative advantages (or disadvantages) of the markets new members
represent.
This congestion underscores the nature of preferential regional trade-the
"club good" provided by virtually all regional organizations-as distincdy
rivalrous. Although regional organizations as a theoretical matter create an
economic commons accessible to every member country, one country's
consumption of the preferential market diminishes the opportunity for other
members to consume it. Regional organizations are thus inherendy animated by
a kind of internal tension that classical clubs escape unless and until congestion
occurs.
B. THE WEAK EXCLUSION PROBLEM
Another problem relating to any description of regional organizations as
providers of club goods is the exclusion mechanism such institutions employ.
Club theorists generally envision effective, and at times even costless, exclusion
mechanisms by which outsiders are barred from the quasi-public goods
members provide. Under such circumstances, the exclusion mechanism serves as
the basis upon which club members derive value from club goods and, more
fundamentally, are incentivized to cooperate. Where, however, exclusion
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mechanisms fail to create or to realize the complete exclusion of outsiders, clubs
are said to produce "impure" public goods.32 Goods are consumed not only by
members, but potentially by nonmembers as well.
Tbis is an important distinction because as a practical matter, regional
organizations are not always exclusive. Instead, regional organizations generally
arise in two basic formats: free trade treaties and customs unions.33 On the one
hand, free trade treaties like NAFTA and CAFTA impose no legal restrictions
on member states as to their relationships with third party countries. Signatories
to free trade treaties can (and do) offer access to third-party countries on terms
equal to those available to members. As a result, these "open" RIAs create
nonexcludable "impure" public goods.
Customs unions, in contrast, provide for a range of different restrictions
on the economic sovereignty of members. Some, for example, have outright
prohibitions against bilateral treatymaking, whereas others are based on
consensus procedures whereby members must first secure the permission of
other members before independently negotiating with third parties.34 In such
instances, customs unions create what are understood as "closed" regional
arrangements that, at least structurally, approach the exclusion dynamics
envisioned in the club literature.
Yet even customs unions fall well short of the hermetic exclusion upon
which club theory is based. This is because although customs unions may restrict
countries from making new treaties once they join, many countries have preexisting commitments that are grandfathered into a custom union's legal
architecture. From the standpoint of exclusion, this is an important flaw given
the reciprocal nature of trade commitments. As noted above, many treaties entail
MFN commitments that require a state to accord to a counterparty the same
favorable terms it offers to other countries. Such commitments are dynamic and
attach not only to past agreements, but to subsequent agreements of the parties,
unless specific exceptions to the treaty are enumerated.

32

Georgia State University Experimental Economics Center, Introduction to Public Goods, (2006),
available online at <http://www.econport.org/econport/request?page=man-pg-introduction>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).

33

See Schwartz and Sykes, 16 Ind Rev Law & Econ at 45 (describing preferential trade agreements
as arising as customs unions or free trade areas) (cited in note 28).

34

The European Union, for example, prohibits, under its common commercial policy, members
from signing bilateral investment and trade treaties, whereas members of the Andean Community,
South America's second-largest RIA, are ultimately permitted to engage outsiders unilaterally,
although such conduct by members is frowned upon. See Brummer, 60 Vand L Rev at 1372-76,
1378 (describing aspects of EC trade and investment law) and 1383-84 (describing the Andean
Community's rules as enshrined by Decision 598) (cited in note 3).
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To demonstrate just what kind of implications this may have for the policy
of RIAs, imagine a situation where Countries A, B, and C are all members of a
regional organization. Assume further that Country D wishes to join the
organization, though it already has in place a bilateral treaty with Country E with
MFN obligations. In such a scenario, once Country D enters the regional
association, and the group decides to extend the existing preferences offered
among group members, Country D will be required under the MFN clause of its
bilateral treaty with Country E to provide the same benefits and preferences to
Country E. This is the case even though Country E will not be required to itself
undertake any form of subsequent liberalization. 5 The same holds for all third
parties that may have bilateral treaties with not only Country D, but Countries
A, B, and C as well.
Importantly, some customs unions do have in place rules for the
prevention of such incorporation by reference-and concomitantly, the costless
liberalization enjoyed by third-party states where RIAs encourage liberalization
among members. The European Union, in particular, additionally requires
uniformity among members as to their economic foreign policy.36 Nevertheless,
even where regional organizations require uniformity, achieving such policy
objectives may be challenging. For one, as regional organizations grow, it may be
difficult for members or regional executives to collect and to examine all the
myriad economic commitments to which member states may be subject. Treaties
are not always registered in one central location, and states must generally
voluntarily divulge the information for such recordkeeping to be effective.37
Furthermore, states themselves may not be aware of all of the commitments to
which previous governments have agreed.38
Uniformity may also incur heavy costs on members, thereby making
compliance at times undesirable. This is because to achieve uniformity, some

35

36

This dilemma confronts MERCOSUR, South America's largest regional organization, insofar as
Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina are all concerned with the bilateral free trade agreements
associate members have in place with outsiders. See id at 1388-89.
Specifically, the European Union has had as an underlying obligation for membership the
commitment of members to the basic constitutional structure, laws, and policies of the European
Union, collectively termed the acquis communitaire. This means that where either a member or
candidate exercises authority in an area in which the Community has concluded a treaty in
pursuance of a common policy, it will be overridden to the extent that it conflicts with EC law.

37

This is also a challenge for multilateral institutions. See Palitha T.B. Kohona, The United Nations
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This is especially the case with bilateral investment treaties where, as officials from developing
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commitments made to other countries.
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members might have to denounce or modify their existing bilateral treaties-a
process that can impose heavy reputational and economic costs.39 Although
treaty denunciation is legal, former counterparties to bilateral agreements will
reset their expectations as to the denunciating member's future policy and
economic (and political) allegiances.4 ° Furthermore, treaty denunciation may
make a country a less attractive destination for trade and investment. For
example, if a state denounced a bilateral investment treaty, treaty termination
would effectively remove promises by the host country not to interfere with
foreign investment. As a result, more political risk would accompany foreign
investment, driving up the cost of capital and making investment less attractive.
Meanwhile, in the case of trade treaties, denunciation of an agreement could
incentivize (former) trade partners to raise duties on exports from the exiting
counterparty. Because of these costs, members will be hesitant to denounce
treaties even where regional rules impose restrictions.
Finally, even if a violation of regional policy is detected, some RIAs may
not have effective enforcement mechanisms. RIAs vary widely in terms of the
degree of enforcement mechanisms they incorporate. Some RIAs, like the
European Union, may have very formal dispute resolution mechanisms such as
courts and arbitration arrangements, while others like the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") may rely more on diplomatic consultations
whenever there are disputes.4' In such less formal contexts, discipline among
members may be difficult to achieve, and uniformity only partially realized.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCOMPLETE REGIONAL CLUBS
A.

INDISTINGUISHABLE CLUBS AND UNDEFINED MEMBERSHIP

The fact that regional organizations do not fully exhibit the characteristics
of classic economic clubs has important implications for our understanding of
the dynamics driving such cooperation. Perhaps most fundamentally, the
imperfections of regional integration suggest a need to rethink the basic concept
of club membership as well as the very contours of the regional "club" itself. At
least formally, RIAs are comprised of identifiable participants that sign a regional
39
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1579 (2005) (describing the factors and consequences of unilateral exit from treaties).
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treaty that sets the basis for ongoing cooperation. Yet, as discussed above, many
nonsignatories can potentially enjoy some of the benefits provided through
collective action without themselves undertaking the commitments involved in
full membership.
This suggests that any analysis of RIAs and their optimal size must explore
and take account of the actual size of a regional organization as encompassing
third-party freeriders as well as its formal members. The theoretical challenge of
such an approach is, of course, that freeriders are not contributing to the
regional trade commons. Returning to the swimming pool analogy, regional
integration is akin to a situation where children can jump over a fence (the
exclusion mechanism) surrounding the pool and go swimming in the shallow
end without paying membership fees for the upkeep of the pool. The children
are not "members" in a classic sense since they are not paying for the upkeep in
the pool and only swim in the shallow area. Nevertheless, as freeriders they are
participants in the commons and consumers of at least part of it. As such, their
activities lend inefficiency to the club insofar as nonmembers can consume part
of the club good while avoiding the costs of membership and cooperation.
B. "UNDERSUPPLIED" CLUB GOODS
By extension, the freerider problem has important implications for the very
dynamics driving regional integration. Club theory is predicated on groups
creating utility through exclusive collective action. The weak exclusion
mechanism of many regional organizations suggests, however, that there are
likely fewer incentives to join a regional organization than a participant would
have in joining a classical economic club. This is particularly important in light of
the fact that accession to regional organizations is often costly, at least in the
short run, because membership opens domestic firms to competition and may
require members to undertake costly changes in their legal, social, or economic
policy. In this context, the existence of a weak exclusion mechanism further
incentivizes members not to join due to the possibility of freeriding on bilateral
agreements. Instead of acceding to costly regional agreements, a country may
instead seek to continue or build upon existing treaties and relationships.
The imperfect excludability characterizing regional integration should
consequently result in fewer preferential markets for trade being supplied than
would be the case if excludability was perfect. Because regional organizations
enjoy weak exclusion mechanisms and are potentially subject to freeriding,
members may enjoy-because of less trade distortion-fewer exports than they
would if regional organizations were truly exclusive economic clubs.
Furthermore, congestion is more likely to occur at an earlier point since RIA
members will face heightened competition in the markets of regional partners
where such countries have entered into bilateral treaties with third-party states.
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As a result, the imperfect club dynamics informing trade and investment
considerations complicate theories as to why states have flocked to regional
organizations. Club theory posits that RIAs create important economic
incentives for states to align with one another. The potentially limited nature of
such benefits suggests, however, that countries may derive additional (and likely
more important) political benefits-especially where RIAs exhibit weak
exclusion. The fact that RIAs often provide a political function and help to
establish peace, military security, and leverage with third party outsiders, may
outweigh any internal inefficiencies or economic costs.
VI. OBSERVATIONS FROM GLOBAL EFFICIENCY
Imperfect organizational structures also, necessarily, complicate dominant
presumptions of regionalism's broader implications for the global economy. As
mentioned above, commentators generally examine regional organizations based
on whether they create new trade or merely divert trade from outside the bloc to
members inside the club. Where they divert trade from outside the bloc to
members, economists criticize regional integration as not so much furthering
integration, but obstructing global efficiency and liberalization.
Though this Article does not put forward an empirical answer to this longdebated question, the incomplete club features of regional integration provide
important theoretical insights unexplored in the academic literature. First, the
imperfect excludability of most regional organizations indicates that although
regional organizations divert trade substantially from third parties, the precise
impact of such diversion will require closer empirical inspection than that
implied in the literature. As shown above, even in closed regional organizations,
some states will not only continue to access markets, but participate in
subsequent liberalization efforts from RIA member states that are counterparties
to prior bilateral agreements. This ability to freeride is an organizational
inefficiency insofar as IA members are not able to recoup the full value of their
liberalization efforts. However, from the standpoint of global efficiency, such
freeriding creates welfare gains. In other words, insofar as it involves a wider
consumption of the preferential market (the club good), it enhances free trade.
Consequently, imperfect excludability should result in a more efficient allocation
of resources.
The existence of multiple equilibria for congestion furthermore suggests
that enlargement-based liberalization may not necessarily arise even where the
accession of new members and the extension of free trade would create for the
group a positive welfare gain. The club-like dynamics of regional integration,
along with the individual member state objectives of trade diversion, imply that
states will have strong market incentives to promote regional expansion only
where such enlargement would bring in less economically competitive members
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to the club. As stated above, it is the accession of countries that are
comparatively less competitive that allows existing members to enjoy welfare
gains insofar as their home industries can expand into new markets without
losing their preferential markets to new competition.
As a result, it is plausible that growth will likely depend to a substantial
degree on the governance and decision-rules of the group. Where, for example,
RIAs have strict membership rules requiring unanimity, admission will be most
likely where the candidate is less competitive than the least efficient or
competitive member of the existing bloc. On the other hand, where majority
voting is in effect, the decision-rule will be based on the relative competitiveness
of those countries that can together form voting blocs sufficient to admit a new
member. Notably, in either instance, politics could inform the decisionmaking of
a state. Where a small country has a low congestion point and does not want to
let another small country into the bloc because it fears a trade diversion, a large
country with a higher congestion point may be able to use its political muscle to
coerce (or to bribe) the smaller regional member into accepting the outsider as a
new member.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that although regional organizations exhibit some
club-like dynamics, they are at best incomplete forms of such cooperation. Not
only does the legal architecture of trade agreements limit the degree to which
regional organizations are truly exclusive, and therefore welfare enhancing for
members, but each member will also, as a result of its own special
characteristics, differ as to the point at which a preferential trading market will
be congested with too many competitors. This heterogeneity suggests that, all
other political factors being equal, expansion of an RIA's membership will be
based not so much on the economic competitiveness of new members, but
instead on the relative inefficiency or competitiveness of a prospective member
state's domestic economy.
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